Ambec, Stefan and Sebi, Carine (2006) Regulating a common-pool resource when extraction costs are heterogeneous: Fees versus quotas. Digital Library of the Commons, Indiana.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)
Official URL: https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001734/00/A...
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine two sets of Fishery regulatory instruments when fishermen differ by their opportunity cost of fishing. The first one is a market-based regulation. It asks fishermen to pay access fees and subsidies those who exit the fishing industry (e.g. by buying out their vessel). The second one imposes a non-transferable quota. Both instruments are commonly used worldwide.
| Item Type: | Documents |
|---|---|
| Class Number: | 500.REG023 |
| Keywords: | CPR, Fishermen, Fishing Regulations, Fisheries Management, Quotas, Access Rights, Tariff, Subsidies |
| Subjects: | Right to Resources |
| Depositing User: | Users 4 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Mar 2022 06:09 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2022 06:09 |
| URI: | http://icsfarchives.net/id/eprint/10049 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
