Schlager, Edella and Ostrom, Elinor (1993) Property-rights regimes and coastal fisheries: An Empirical analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Ambiguous terms blur analytical and prescriptive clarity. The term common property resource is a glaring example of a term that is repeatedly used by political economists to refer to varying empirical situations including:(1) property owned by a government,(2) property owned by no one, and (3) property owned and defended by a community of resource users. The term is also used to refer to any common-pool resource used by multiple individuals regardless of the type of property rights involved. The purpose of this essay is to develop a conceptual schema for arraying property rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights that may be held by the users of a resource system. We define a property rights schema ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We do not find that" owners” are the only resource users who make long-term investments in the improvement of resource systems. Proprietors face incentives that are frequently substantial enough to encourage similar long-term investments. Even claimants may manage use patterns to an extent not predicted by a simpler property rights dichotomy. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of coastal fisheries.
| Item Type: | Documents |
|---|---|
| Class Number: | 500.PRO010 |
| Keywords: | Fisheries Management, Common Property Resources (CPR), Coastal Regulations, Coastal Fisheries, Fishing Grounds |
| Subjects: | Right to Resources |
| Depositing User: | Chitti Babu ICSF |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jan 2022 04:15 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Jul 2025 06:15 |
| URI: | http://icsfarchives.net/id/eprint/6394 |
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